The SPD’s victory was supposed to be like a breath of fresh air after years of CDU/CSU rule. However, in the context of Eastern policy, Chancellor Scholz continues the tradition of indulgent treatment of the Russian Federation, the consequences of which have proved tragic.
Germany’s refusal to provide military aid to Ukraine and its resistance to removing Russia from the SWIFT system has sparked some controversy and put European solidarity in question. Such behavior is not surprising given the SPD’s longstanding close ties with Russia, symbolized by the discredited former chancellor Gerhard Schroder.
The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline was like a weapon that Germany almost handed over to Putin on a silver platter. The Social Democrats strenuously denied the geopolitical dimension of this project. Voices from Warsaw and the Baltic states warning of the consequences of the gas pipeline construction for the region were consistently ignored. It was considered a sign of anti-Russian hysteria. Meanwhile, Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and oil was growing.
The fact that leading SPD politicians pushed for Nord Stream 2 even when Russian troops were concentrated on the Ukrainian border further emboldened Kremlin dignitaries. It was known that Russian gas was to provide Germany with a smooth energy transition after the decision was made to shut down nuclear power plants. After the revelations of the crimes committed in Bucha, the German government remained skeptical about imposing an embargo on oil and gas from Russia.
In West Germany, 46% of Germans supported the sanctions, while only 28% supported them in East Germany. The roots of this friendly attitude towards Russia can be found in history. For 40 years, the GDR linked East Germans economically and socially with Russia. The close relationship was also accompanied by strong anti-American sentiment. Gorbachev’s contribution to German reunification and guilt over World War II and the crimes committed in the Soviet Union are not insignificant.
The myth of Russia’s key political and economic importance still exists in the German consciousness, whereas it is the countries lying in between that are more important to the German economy and have a larger population potential (190 million inhabitants) than Russia (150 million). The SPD diverts attention from the disastrous effects of German Ostpolitik on eastern borders and chooses Moscow as a partner. Ukraine is seen as a Russian sphere of influence.
While France and the US have chosen tough rhetoric to get Putin to change his position, the German government gives the impression that it is only interested in dialogue. Vladimir Putin does not expect dialogue from the West. He wants the West to get out of his way. The Russian president has never hidden his political ambitions and his desire to return to the idea of a Great Russia. The reaction of German dignitaries to his memorable speech in Munich in 2007 was restrained. It was the moment when Putin exposed his cards and suggested what his real goal was. The speech, however, did not give world leaders pause for thought.
They consistently ignored the warning signals and disregarded the warnings of allies who, over the years, have come to know Russia better than anyone in the West. Today we are once again watching on European soil the drama of a war that could have been prevented. Germany is often put in the role of a leading country in the EU. Observing the policy of Olaf Scholz’s government towards Russia, one has to wonder whether they have the right to aspire to such a role today. Much time and work are now needed to rebuild mutual trust. The invasion of Ukraine and the massacres in Mariupol and Bucha are a wake-up call for Germany and a moment to understand that the political love affair with Russia is a toxic relationship.
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